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Introduction
The emergence and global spread of a
novel strain of human influenza A/H1N1
during 2009 (pandemic [H1N1] 2009
influenza, or H1N1pdm) has highlighted
the importance of data from both detailed
outbreak investigations and population
surveillance for the support of public health
decision making. For example, public
health organizations in several countries
undertook detailed case investigations to
build databases of the first few hundred
cases, which include laboratory confirma-
tion status, age, relative severity, exposure
history, onset of symptoms, and contact
history (for example, the UK First Few
Hundred project [1]). Descriptive analyses
of such data allowed decision-makers to
conclude rapidly that the disease caused by
the novel strain was relatively mild for the
majority of confirmed cases and that it was
being transmitted efficiently between chil-
dren. Therefore, most countries decided
that stringent interventions at the commu-
nity level (such as proactive school closures)
werenotappropriate,because theirbenefits
were limited when compared with the high
overall cost to society. Population surveil-
lance was also crucial in the early stages of
the pandemic.Indeed,the twoindependent
influenza cases [2] that provided the viral
isolates used to discern the presence of a
novel strain were obtained through a
sentinel surveillance system designed for
exactly that purpose [3].
In recent years, ithas become common to
use mathematical modeling to analyze the
underlying disease dynamics of outbreaks.
Parameters such as the reproductive num-
ber R [4], which can be estimated from
outbreak investigation data [5], give insight
into how underlying transmission dynamics
will influence the likely impact of possible
interventions. For example,if the underlying
basic reproductive number, R0, is low, the
impact of community-based mitigation
strategies against a severe influenza pan-
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the use of specific mathematical models to
explicitly support particular policy decisions
masks a more general aspect of decision
making, namely, the inclusion of ‘‘modelers’’
in the policy advice process to ensure that
quantitative insights into epidemic dynamics
are available. This article is the result of the
first meeting of an informal network con-
vened by the World Health Organization
(WHO)for the modeling of H1N1pdm. The
network is made up of public health
professionals, policy makers, and scientists
with expertise in the transmission dynamics,
epidemiology, ecology, and evolution of
human infectious diseases [7].
The H1N1pdm pandemic will continue
to generate novel challenges for public
health decision makers over the next one
to two years. In this article, we suggest
likely challenges and consider how uncer-
tainties over the disease dynamics may
affect policy formulation. The main ob-
jective of this exercise is not to provide
evidence to support specific policy alter-
natives. Rather, we try to anticipate and
prioritize the needed nonroutine data that
should be planned for and funded in the
short term to be of significant value to
policy makers in the medium and longer
term.
Public Health Challenges
Measuring Age-Specific Immunity to
Infection
To be able to estimate the susceptibility
of a population to future similar strains, it is
important to understand the reason that
initial epidemics of a new strain fade out.
Using routinely collected data, it will be
difficult to know with confidence why any
particularlocalepidemicofH1N1pdmends
(Figure 1). It may be that the number of
susceptible individuals has been depleted by
the development of immunity, that a
population-wide public health response to
the epidemic has occurred (and was sus-
tained), or that transmissibility dropped for
seasonalreasons.Mostlikely,local fade-outs
are due to a combination of these factors.
Routinely collected data such as influenza-
like-illness (ILI) reporting from sentinel
networks and reported hospitalizations suf-
ferfromanumberoffrailties:Theydiscount
a potentially large unobserved subclinical
population, they suffer from age-specific
biases in health care–seeking patterns, and
they cannot differentiate among upper
respiratory viruses with similar presenta-
tions. Representative serological surveys
provide the only viable means to infer
population-level susceptibility with any
accuracy, especially if there is a substantial
proportion of asymptomatic infections.
Early available data suggested that
children are more likely to become
infected than adults [8,9,10]. With a
relatively low overall transmissibility, these
characteristics are likely to lead to a lower
attack rate among adults and a higher
attack rate among children. Therefore,
one option for H1N1pdm to evolve to
maintain fitness after an initial wave of
infection would be to improve its ability to
infect adults, with or without a substantial
antigenic change (for instance, a shift in
the transmission efficiency of the virus
between droplet and aerosol could affect
children and adults in different ways).
Should H1N1pdm evolve to be more
infectious to adults, knowing with confi-
dence the proportion of the population
exposed during the initial wave would be
of substantial public health value, because
it would allow robust upper bounds to be
placed on the size of subsequent waves.
Also, it would be important to capture any
such change because the severity of illness
for confirmed cases seems to be greater in
adults than in children [9,11].
Accurately Quantifying Severity
Accurate estimates of the per-person
risk of severe outcomes, such as the case
hospitalization ratio (i.e., the number of
hospitalized cases divided by total number
of infections), the hospitalization ICU ratio
(the total number of cases requiring
intensive care divided by total number of
hospitalized cases), and the case-fatality
ratio (the total number of deaths that are
caused by H1N1pdm infection divided by
the total number of infections), are re-
quired for planning purposes and also to
provide at-risk individuals with the best
possible information. Unfortunately, re-
porting biases for both the numerator and
the denominator in hospitalization ratio
calculations make accurate estimates diffi-
cult. For example, mild infections in young
children are much more likely to be
reported than mild infections in adults,
whereas deaths attributable to H1N1pdm
depend on testing capacity and policy. In
addition, some countries have hospitalized
patients for isolation purposes, rather than
because they were suffering from severe
illness. Therefore, quantifying the overall
exposure of the population using a time
series of representative, age-stratified sero-
logical surveys will greatly improve the
accuracy of our estimates of risk, by giving
definitive denominator information.
Recent vaccination programs targeting
those at higher risk of severe clinical
outcomes will further complicate the
accurate assessment of severity, because
many individuals were infected before
being vaccinated. Although it is unlikely
that serological assays can distinguish
accurately between natural infection and
vaccination at the individual level, surveys
should continue to include vaccinated
individuals and to record symptoms and
vaccination status where possible. At the
population level, it is likely that the
vaccine-induced immune response will
have a substantially different distribution
of antibody levels than the immune
response generated by natural infection.
Improving Treatment Outcomes for
Severe Cases
We suggest that, although they are not
directly linked to epidemic dynamics,
hospital-based cohort studies of H1N1pdm
cases are needed to assess the pathogenicity
of H1N1pdm infection and to help clarify
estimates of relative risk of severe disease
and death among routinely reported clin-
ical cases. These studies should collect
Summary Points
N As the global epidemiology of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza (H1N1pdm)
virus strain unfolds into 2010, substantial policy challenges will continue to
present themselves for the next 12 to 18 months.
N Here, we anticipate six public health challenges and identify data that are
required for public health decision making: Measuring age-specific immunity to
infection; accurately quantifying severity; improving treatment outcomes for
severe cases; quantifying the effectiveness of interventions; capturing the full
impact of the pandemic on mortality; and rapidly identifying and responding to
antigenic variants.
N Representative serological surveys stand out as a critical source of data with
which to reduce uncertainty around policy choices for both pharmaceutical and
nonpharmaceutical interventions after the initial wave has passed.
N Continuing to monitor the time course of incidence of severe H1N1pdm cases
will give a clear picture of variability in underlying transmissibility of the virus
during population-wide changes in behavior such as school vacations and other
nonpharmaceutical interventions.
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trum of disease including onset and dura-
tion of symptoms, prevalence of underlying
conditions (such as pregnancy, chronic
respiratory disease, immunosuppression,
smoking, obesity, chronic respiratory con-
ditions, diabetes, and neurologic disorders),
duration of hospital/ICU stay, complica-
tions from infection including bacterial
superinfection, antiviral/antibiotic treat-
ment including when administered, the
efficacy of other adjunctive measures (such
as immune modulation, novel oxygenation,
or ventilation strategies), and serial blood
and respiratory samples for RT-PCR and
virus culture to determine the extent and
duration of viral shedding and antiviral
treatment failure. The WHO, US Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, Cana-
dian Clinical Trials Group, and South East
Asian Infectious Disease Clinical Research
Network have developed clinical data
collection forms for such studies [12,13]
that could be adapted to be context specific
and implemented in a representative group
of hospitals in each participating country.
Although these studies will not capture the
mild spectrum of illness (as discussed
above), they will fill the current data gaps
about pathogenicity and the clinical course
of illness including prognostic information.
The use of propensity scores could yield
valuable insights into the relative efficacy of
different treatment strategies in the short
term, while awaiting results of prospective
trials.
Quantifying the Effectiveness of
Interventions
After an initial establishment phase,
changes in the growth rate of a novel
infectious disease can provide an accurate
measure of changes in transmission rates. If
the doubling time of the number of new
cases is constant in the early stages, then
significant changes in underlying transmis-
sibility are unlikely to have occurred.
However, if the doubling time appears to
slow down during school vacations/holi-
days/closures or during other widespread
changes in mixing, then this likely indicates
a genuine shift in the rate of disease
transmission [14]. Also, in populations with
high vaccine coverage in children during
the early stages of the epidemic, we would
hope thatthecoarsetime seriesofincidence
would have been affected. Accurate mea-
sures of changes in the growth rate—and
possibly also the age-composition of report-
ed cases—are required to quantify the
population-wide effect of changes in be-
havior, such as the start of school vacations
and restrictions in mass gatherings. Coun-
tries with hospital-based respiratory sur-
veillance systems, which are often not
optimized in its data specification and
collection, could be enhanced to collect
more detailed clinical and laboratory data
(described above) from ILI, ARI (acute
respiratory illness), and SARI (severe acute
respiratory illness) patients [15]. In addi-
tion, clinical information of ILI, ARI, and
SARI patients paired with laboratory
testing could provide estimates of the
burden of seasonal influenza compared
with that of pandemic influenza.
Capturing the Full Impact of the
Pandemic on Mortality
We should aim to monitor excess
mortality due to H1N1pdm in the timeliest
Figure 1. Epidemic curves based on surveillance data could mask quite different underlying transmission dynamics. We used a
deterministic SIR (susceptible–infected–recovered) model [27] with two age classes: children (20% of the population, a typical proportion for ages0 –
18 years in a developed population) and adults (80%). The initial doubling time was set to 5 days with a 2.6 day generation time. These parameters
imply a basic reproductive number of 1.4 (for this model [5]). The seed was equivalent to one infectious individual in a population of 7 million at time
0, and mixing between age groups was consistent with contact diary data for the UK (children defined as aged,20 y) [28]. The shaded regions show
daily incidence of symptomatic cases for children (red) and adults (green). We assumed that 86% of infections were symptomatic [8]. The black line is
the estimated number of hospital beds required at a given time. The susceptibility of children relative to adults was parameterized using the ratio of
child cases to adult cases during the exponential phase of epidemic growth. (A) Baseline scenario. The ratio of early cases was proportionate to the
population (20:80, children:adults) and all ages were equally likely to require hospitalization. (B) A scenario likely to be closer to current nH1N1
dynamics. The ratio of early cases was 50:50 and adults were much more likely to require hospitalization.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000275.g001
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attributable to seasonal and previous
pandemic influenza is considerably higher
than the number certified by vital statistics
registration as due to influenza or by the
number of influenza deaths reported
through surveillance schemes [16]; the
total number estimated depends strongly
on whether the excess above baseline is
confined to deaths from pneumonia and
influenza, or whether all respiratory and
circulatory deaths or all-cause deaths are
considered [17]. Often, a number of
causes contribute to individual mortality.
Influenza-associated mortality has tradi-
tionally been estimated as the excess
pneumonia and influenza (P & I) mortality
above a baseline of deaths during seasonal
influenza epidemic periods. Excess P & I
mortality estimates are often not timely, as
data compilation can take months. To
monitor influenza excess mortality in a
more timely fashion, several countries
have set up sentinel systems that they
integrate in their routine influenza surveil-
lance (e.g., European monitoring of excess
mortality for public health action—Euro-
MoMo, http://www.euromomo.eu). The
US CDC established a sentinel system in
121 US cities several decades ago. More
recently, several European countries have
developed real-time monitoring schemes
of mortality in which number of deaths by
age are transmitted electronically from all
or a subset of municipalities to a central
database. These schemes allow much
more rapid assessment of overall mortality
trends and are being utilized in near-real–
time during the 2009/2010 Northern
Hemisphere influenza season to ensure
that policy makers are continuously kept
abreast of how excess mortality for the
pandemic will compare with similar statis-
tics often quoted for seasonal influenza.
Rapidly Identifying and Responding
to Antigenic Variants
It will be useful to isolate virus from
infected individuals for whom there is also
a serum sample. Although doing this
systematically from all cases would place
an intolerable burden on supporting
laboratory services, there will be value in
developing substudies amongst larger se-
rological surveys. Obtaining such paired
virological and serological data from
vaccinated individuals will be particularly
useful because it will allow the investiga-
tion of antiviral resistance and vaccine
failure. In some instances, vaccine failure
could be due to an antigenic variant that is
not protected by immunity raised against
the vaccine strain. Therefore, active sam-
pling of symptomatic vaccinated individu-
als could help to provide early warning of
vaccine-escape mutants, which, if they are
rare initially, might take longer to be
detected by routine surveillance.
Meeting the Challenges
While there have been recommenda-
tions focusing on how to maintain and
enhance population-level surveillance
when in most countries case numbers
have far exceeded routine testing capacity
[12,18], here we suggest specific nonrou-
tine data that will help public health policy
makers to address six public health
challenges that we anticipate will continue
for the next 12 to 18 months. Because of
inherent biases in the routine reporting of
cases of differing levels of severity, suffi-
ciently powered representative serological
surveys will be useful in the short and
medium term to help quantify the degree
of susceptibility in the population and to
help characterize individual-level severity.
Systematic reporting of the incidence of
ARI and SARI will help to characterize
the speed of growth of the epidemic and
hence allow the detection of significant
changes in underlying transmissibility.
Specific data gathering processes are also
required to accurately define the clinical
spectrum of severe disease, measure excess
mortality in a timely fashion, and help to
rapidly detect possible vaccine escape,
antiviral resistant strains, and other mu-
tant strains.
The need for rapid serological studies
stands out among these impending knowl-
edge gaps. Historically, the best informa-
tion on circulating seasonal influenza has
come from prospective community studies
based on households. Two important such
studies in the US were the Tecumseh
community study [19,20] and the Seattle
virus watch [21]. Study participants pro-
vided periodic serological samples every 4
to 6 months over several years. Bracketing
sera were used to detect infections through
significant antibody titer rises. In addition,
the serologic data provided estimates of
the degree of partial immunity in the
populations under study at any point in
time. Finally, influenza symptom data
coupled with virological identification
provided valuable information of infection
and illness attack rates by age and other
demographic characteristics, as well as the
pathogenicity and virulence of the identi-
fied circulating strains of influenza. Even
today, these studies provide the most
complete description of the epidemiology
of influenza circulating in the community.
It is therefore encouraging that such
detailed prospective community serologic
studies are underway or planned in the
many countries including Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, China,
France, Finland, Germany, Hong Kong
SAR, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the
Philippines, Singapore, Sweden, Taiwan,
Thailand, Turkey, the UK, and the US.
Observing the serological attack rate
across countries gives us a standardized
measure of the risk of infection across
countries. Such a standardized measure
facilitates international comparisons that
are essential to assess the effectiveness of
interventions against influenza in different
countries. It is difficult to compare doctor
consultations, hospitalizations, and even
deaths, because of differences in reporting
systems; by relating the number of doctor
consultations, hospitalizations, and deaths
to the serological attack rate we can assess
country-specific biases in the reporting
systems.
Although H1N1pdm is antigenically
distinct from other currently circulating,
seasonal human influenza strains [22],
work is ongoing to validate reliable
serological assays. Current standard tech-
niques that have been used to quantify
antigenic distance between strains depend
on antibodies raised in animal models
[23]. However, it is reasonable to expect
that unpaired assays using human sera will
give a good indication of prior exposure to
the pandemic strain in most age groups
[24], especially once cross-sectional data
have been calibrated using paired sera.
Despite these potential issues, it seems
reasonable to assume that unpaired sero-
logical surveys will give an informative
snapshot of exposure history at a popula-
tion level and that it will be straightfor-
ward to characterize the degree of uncer-
tainty associated with any single titration.
Pharmaceutical interventions will likely
play a minor role in middle- and low-
income countries for the 2009/2010
pandemic, nor would they have for a
more severe strain. Both the epidemiology
and options for interventions are clearly
different for less-developed countries com-
pared with highly industrialized countries.
Population density, mobility, household
structure, and school attendance patterns
all differ significantly between and within
regions. Therefore, it is not safe to assume
that patterns of infection well-described in
one population will be widely representa-
tive of the world’s population. In particu-
lar, after the initial Northern and Southern
Hemisphere waves of infection, it will not
be wise to assume that all other popula-
tions have experienced similar infection
attack rates. In particular, there may be
substantial differences between urban and
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 4 June 2010 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e1000275rural populations, with their different
mobility and mixing patterns. Empirical
studies should be conducted in multiple
representative populations.
Building on existing demographic sur-
veillance or influenza surveillance systems
provides an option for many countries.
Where possible, samples can be obtained
from cross-sectional serological surveys.
Where available, samples from national
blood supply systems can provide real-
time monitoring of infection incidence or
cross-reactive antibody responses to
H1N1pdm, as can residual blood samples
taken from patients for diagnostic labora-
tory testing (although these samples will
not necessarily represent the entire popu-
lation). In low-resource countries without
such systems in place, surveillance systems
for diseases such as dengue and polio
could be adapted for H1N1pdm. For
example, in several countries in South
East Asia and Central and South America,
community-based surveillance studies
were established to assess the burden of
dengue among children and adults. Sim-
ilar surveys have proved extremely useful
during outbreaks of chikungunya in the
Indian Ocean in 2006/2007 [25,26]. Polio
surveillance, which aims to identify all
acute flaccid paralysis cases among chil-
dren through reporting and laboratory
testing, has wide geographic coverage in
Africa and Asia. In addition, such systems,
which routinely collect blood, could be
used to evaluate antibody levels. Lastly,
seroprevalence studies that are currently
planned or underway for highly patho-
genic avian influenza (HPAI)/H5N1 in
several African and Asian countries could
also test for anti-H1N1pdm antibodies.
Preparedness plans will be revised by
many nations in the medium term to
incorporate lessons learned from the 2009
pandemic. A thorough assessment of the
value of data from all sources will be
crucial if the quality of information
available for decision-makers during future
pandemics is to be improved. We suggest
that some of the most valuable data, such
as estimates of age-specific serological
attack rates, have not become available
until far after the time when it would have
been needed to support decision making.
The establishment of a preapproved
ethical review status for key field studies
is a priority. Also, if such studies are to be
initiated in a short time, investigators may
choose to design and pilot them in
association with nonacademic partners.
Supporting Information
Alternative Language Abstract S1
Abstract translated into German by DJS.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.
1000275.s001 (0.03 MB DOC)
Alternative Language Abstract S2
Abstract translated into Portuguese by
TdS.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.
1000275.s002 (0.03 MB DOC)
Alternative Language Abstract S3
Abstract translated into Spanish by TdS.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.
1000275.s003 (0.03 MB DOC)
Alternative Language Abstract S4
Abstract translated into Finnish by TA.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.
1000275.s004 (0.03 MB DOC)
Alternative Language Abstract S5
Abstract translated into French by J-CD.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.
1000275.s005 (0.03 MB DOC)
Alternative Language Abstract S6
Abstract translated into Romanian by TA.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.
1000275.s006 (0.03 MB DOC)
Alternative Language Abstract S7
Abstract translated into Swedish by TA.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.
1000275.s007 (0.03 MB DOC)
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Anthony
Mounts and Matthew Lim from WHO for their
critical review and useful suggestions.
Author Contributions
ICMJE criteria for authorship read and met:
MDVK TA NGB SB JCD TdS CF GML ML
IMLJ ESM CER DKS DJS JW PJW NMF SR.
Agree with the manuscript’s results and conclu-
sions: MDVK TA NGB SB JCD TdS CF GML
ML IMLJ ESM CER DKS DJS JW PJW NMF
SR. Wrote the first draft of the paper: MDVK
TA SR. Contributed to the writing of the paper:
MDVK TA NGB SB JCD TdS CF GML ML
IMLJ ESM CER DKS DJS JW PJW NMF SR.
Contributed to the discussion that led to the
paper, helped to draft sections of the paper, and
reviewed the final manuscript: TA NGB DJS.
Involved in discussions that led to the paper:
TdS. Contributed to design of content, drafted
section of paper, reviewed paper: ESM. In-
volved in discussions that lead to the paper;
helped define target audience and intended
impact: CER. Suggested the topic: NMF.
References
1. Novel Swine-Origin Influenza A Virus Investiga-
tion Team (2009) Emergence of a Novel Swine-
Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus in Humans.
N Engl J Med 360: 2605–2615.
2. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) (2009) Swine influenza A (H1N1) infection
in two children—Southern California, March-
April 2009. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 58:
400–402.
3. Faix DJ, Sherman SS, Waterman SH (2009)
Rapid-test sensitivity for novel swine-origin influ-
enza A (H1N1) virus in humans. N Engl J Med
361: 728–729.
4. Heesterbeek JAP (2002) Heesterbeek JAP (2002)
A brief history of R0 and a recipe for its
calculation. Acta Biotheor 50: 189–204.
5. Wallinga J, Lipsitch M (2007) How generation
intervals shape the relationship between growth
rates and reproductive numbers. Proc R Soc
Lond B Biol Sci 274: 599–604.
6. Wu JT, Riley S, Fraser C, Leung GM (2006)
Reducing the Impact of the Next Influenza
Pandemic Using Household-Based Public Health
Interventions. PLoS Med 3: e361. doi:10.1371/
journal.pmed.0030361.
7. World Health Organization (WHO) (2009)
Mathematical modelling of the pandemic H1N1
2009. Wkly Epidemiol Rec 84: 341–352.
8. Fraser C, Donnelly CA, Cauchemez S,
Hanage WP, Van Kerkhove MD, et al. (2009)
Pandemic Potential of a Strain of Influenza A
(H1N1): Early Findings. Science 324: 1557–1561.
9. WHO (2009) Preliminary information important
for understanding the evolving situation. Pandem-
ic (H1N1) 2009 briefing note 4. Available: http://
www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/h1n1_
situation_20090724/en/index.html. Accessed 10
July 2009.
10. Cauchemez S, Donnelly C, Reed C, Ghani A,
Fraser C, et al. (2009) Household Transmission of
2009 Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) Virus in the
United States. NEJM 361: 2619–2627.
11. Vaillant L, La Ruche G, Tarantola A, Barboza P,
epidemic intelligence team at InVS (2009)
Epidemiology of fatal cases associated with
pandemic H1N1 influenza 2009. Eurosurveil-
lance 14: pii:19309.
12. WHO (2009) Human infection with pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 virus: updated interim WHO guid-
ance on global surveillance. Available http://www.
who.int/csr/resources/publications/swineflu/
interim_guidance/en/index.html. World Health
Organization. Accessed 10 July 2009.
13. CDC (2009) CDC H1N1 Flu: Clinical Data
Collection Forms and Templates for Collection of
Information on Patients Infected with Novel Influ-
enza A (H1N1). Available: http://www.cdc.gov/
h1n1flu/clinicians/clinician_forms_templates.htm.
Accessed 10 July 2009.
14. Wu J, Cowling B, Lau E, Ip D, Ho L, et al. (2009)
Reduced transmissibility of pandemic influenza A
(H1N1) associated with school closure and
summer vacation, Hong Kong, 2009. EID, In
press.
15. Ortiz JR, Sotomayor V, Uez OC, Oliva O,
Bettels D, et al. (2009) Strategy to Enhance
Influenza Surveillance Worldwide. Emerging
Infect Dis 15: 1271–1278.
16. Thompson W, Weintraub E, Dhankhar P,
Cheung P-Y, Brammer L, et al. (2009) Estimates
of US influenza-associated deaths made using
four different methods. Influenza Other Respi
Viruses 3: 37–49.
17. Thompson W, Shay D, Weintraub E, Brammer L,
Cox N, et al. (2003) Mortality associated with
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 5 June 2010 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e1000275influenza and respiratory syncytial virus in the
United States. JAMA 289: 179–186.
18. Lipsitch M, Hayden F, Cowling B, Leung G
(2009) How to maintain surveillance for novel
influenza A H1N1 when there are too many cases
to count. Lancet 374: 1209–1211.
19. Longini I, Koopman J, Haber M, Cotsonis G
(1988) Statistical inference for infectious diseases.
Risk-specific household and community transmis-
sion parameters. Am J Epidemiol 128: 845–859.
20. Monto A, Koopman J, Longini I (1985) Tecum-
seh study of illness. XIII. Influenza infection and
disease, 1976-1981. Am J Epidemiol 121:
811–822.
21. Fox JP, Hall CE, Cooney MK, Foy HM (1982)
Influenzavirus infections in Seattle families,
1975-1979. I. Study design, methods and the
occurrence of infections by time and age.
Am J Epidemiol 116: 212–227.
22. Garten RJ, Davis CT, Russell CA, Shu B,
Lindstrom S, et al. (2009) Antigenic and Genetic
Characteristics of Swine-Origin 2009 A(H1N1)
Influenza Viruses Circulating in Humans. Sci-
ence 325: 197–201.
23. Smith DJ, Lapedes AS, de Jong JC,
Bestebroer TM, Rimmelzwaan GF, et al.
(2004) Mapping the Antigenic and Genetic
Evolution of Influenza Virus. Science 305:
371–376.
24. Hancock K, Veguilla V, Lu X, Zhong W,
Butler EN, et al. (2009) Cross-Reactive Antibody
Responses to the 2009 Pandemic H1N1 Influenza
Virus. N Engl J Med 361: 1945–1952.
25. Ge ´rardin P, Guernier V, Perrau J, Fianu A, Le
Roux K, et al. (2008) Estimating Chikungunya
prevalence in La Re ´union Island outbreak by
serosurveys: two methods for two critical times of
the epidemic. BMC Infect Dis 8: 99.
26. Sissoko D, Moendandze A, Malvy D, Giry C,
Ezzedine K, et al. (2008) Seroprevalence and risk
factors of chikungunya virus infection in Mayotte,
Indian Ocean, 2005-2006: a population-based
survey. PLoS One 3: e3066. doi:10.1371/journal.
pone.0003066.
27. Hethcote HW (2000) The mathematics of infec-
tious diseases. SIAM Rev 42: 599–653.
28. Mossong J, Hens N, Jit M, Beutels P, Auranen K,
et al. (2008) Social contacts and mixing patterns
relevant to the spread of infectious diseases. PLoS
Med 5: e74. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050074.
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 6 June 2010 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e1000275